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The National Health Service (NHS) has consistently been regarded as an important and valued institution.​[1]​ It is not difficult to see why.  Founded on the principle that good healthcare should be available to all, it was built on three values that it should: meet everyone’s needs; be free at the point of delivery; and be based on clinical need, rather than any ability to pay. Several well-publicised scandals​[2]​ may have affected confidence to a degree, but the NHS remains a cherished feature of our institutional landscape. With caveats often accompanying the interpretation of satisfaction polls, a recent MORI survey shows that the public continues to see the NHS as a valued institution and most people remain satisfied with how it is run.​[3]​ It appears “We [continue to] love our NHS, despite its failings.”​[4]​

There has however been disquiet over the changing administrative and legal structures underpinning health care services in England, and their implications for health service-users.​[5]​  Particularly since the 1980s, several policy adjustments have made important changes to the NHS. An administrative approach influencing these changes is new public management (NPM),​[6]​ understood as a collection of doctrines that express a preferred method of organisation and which emphasise: professional management; avoidance of direct state management and increased competition.​[7]​ These doctrines are justified, among other things, on grounds of parsimony and efficiency.​[8]​ Over time, a further series of components have been incorporated into NHS administration, such as democratic participation and community membership.​[9]​ The latter components are said to reflect values such as rectitude and trust.​[10]​  Overall, these changes shape how we view the NHS, and are thought to be among the standards against which it is judged.​[11]​ They provoke important questions: do administrative systems accommodate user preferences and are processes orientated towards user interests?

This brings us to our focus, the HSCA 2012. This Act, which remains underexplored, was introduced along with a policy discourse emphasizing increased accountability, transparency and stakeholder engagement.  Despite this, close inspection shows a legal framework that is less favourable to service-users than this discourse suggests. Not only does the HSCA stress economic imperatives more than values such as community engagement, but some provisions appear to weaken user participation in crucial areas of decision making and support doctrines that promote competition and minimal state interference in services.​[12]​ But we argue that the provisions of the HSCA which actually weaken accountability and transparency are concealed by policy and legislative form and style that, on the face of it, claim to empower citizens through greater accountability and transparency, but do not reflect the reality. For this reason, we should be vigilant; the arrangements in place to institute stakeholder engagement across the NHS are configured in ways that do not fulfil policy ambitions in this area. 
The article starts by briefly outlining the NHS’s legislative background. Then, it provides an overview of the HSCA but moves on to analyse two types of activity: reporting and non-reporting. Briefly, reporting is a process for measuring, recording and disclosing information,​[13]​ whereas non-reporting activities refer to mechanisms besides reporting (e.g., meetings, consultation) through which stakeholders (e.g., regulators, public) communicate.  As methods of communication, reporting and non-reporting are crucial activities because they enable stakeholders to solve problems. These two types of activity supplement three functions reformed under the HSCA (i.e., health care provision, commissioning, and consumer championing). Following an analysis of these two types of activities, the authors then discuss some of the implications and issues around the HSCA and how it potentially undermines some of the principles it supposedly upholds (e.g., accountability). As part of this discussion, we draw on the concept of core accountability. Core accountability relates to an obligation to explain and justify conduct and involves asking questions, eliciting information and passing judgement on decision makers. Applying core accountability, the authors argue that the HSCA does not provide adequate opportunities for service-users and the public to question NHS bodies, elicit information from them and pass judgement.

II.	A CHANGING LEGAL ARCHITECTURE
While we outline the regulatory history of the NHS in phases, we are not suggesting these phases are autonomous. They overlap, and have common features. The first phase, which ran from its establishment to the early 1980s, focused on welfarism, redistribution and social justice. The prevailing view was that everyone was entitled to free health care at the point of delivery. Health care management was hierarchical,​[14]​ and there was a permanent and stable administration.​[15]​ There was limited decision making delegation, limited scope for involvement of citizens,​[16]​ and users and the public were largely separated from decision making processes. The second phase ran from the early 1980s to the early 1990s, and was characterised as a reaction to the view that the NHS – like other services – was bureaucratic and inefficient. In order to improve efficiency, several reforms were influenced by the emerging ideology of NPM. It should be noted that NPM is seen as a loose collection of doctrines (e.g., increased competition, value for money, business planning, private sector participation) that serve different political agendas by claiming to offer more efficient and effective approaches to service administration and the use of public resources.​[17]​ An example of how NPM was introduced during this second phase can be seen in proposals to provide General Practitioners (GPs) with financial incentives to achieve ‘good practice’ as well as in other proposals to enhance user choice.​[18]​

A third phase is identifiable during the early 1990s, one that further embedded the doctrines of NPM. A White Paper published in 1989 ​[19]​ contained proposals enacted by the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990. Under this measure, GPs were tasked with managing budgets and entering contracts with NHS providers. They were charged, too, with purchasing health care, on behalf of their local communities, from hospitals (i.e., the purchaser-provider split).  A more consumer-oriented approach could also be seen during this period through measures that strengthened the public’s right to information about standards of care​[20]​ as well as measures that promoted patient choice.​[21]​ Pertinent, too, was the introduction of health service performance indicators.​[22]​ 

From 1997 onwards, we start to observe a fourth phase. The New Labour government signalled its commitment to the purchaser-provider split.​[23]​ It also made a commitment to making government leaner and more devolved​[24]​ and to making public services, in its words, joined up and responsive.​[25]​  Consistent with this policy discourse, Monitor was established as the new Independent Regulator of NHS Foundation Trusts.​[26]​ Monitor was empowered to authorise an NHS Trust’s application to become a Foundation Trust (under conditions), a status bringing a particular Trust more fiscal autonomy.​[27]​ Importantly, however, there were some concerns during this phase that a democratic deficit existed in public services​[28]​ in the sense that powers were being devolved to unelected bodies that were managing significant budgets and which were making important decisions about people’s lives. In response to this perceived deficit, certain members of Foundation Trusts were to be elected by local people,​[29]​ and GP purchasing was replaced with the more collaborative (e.g., involving GPs, nurses) Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).​[30]​ Moreover, greater emphasis was placed on assessing the function of NHS Trusts and Foundation Trusts through publicly accessible performance indicators.​[31]​Another important development during this phase was the creation of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, now known as the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NIHCE).​[32]​ To improve the quality of services, NIHCE was tasked with developing clinical standards in collaboration with service-users. Finally, there was the creation of several bodies that, to varying degree, were responsible for engaging patients (e.g,, Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health (CPPIH),​[33]​ Patient Advisory and Liaison Service (PALS),​[34]​ Patients’ Forums,​[35]​ local authority overview committees (replacing the CPPIH)​[36]​ and Local Involvement Networks (or LINks)).​[37]​ While the approach underpinning this fourth phase is hard to define,​[38]​ it appeared to align more traditional NPM doctrines (e.g., economic autonomy, competition) with a need to meet consumer expectations on health service provision through experiments in democracy.​[39]​

The policy background to the HSCA consisted of a 2007 Conservative policy paper​[40]​ and the 2010 Coalition White Paper.​[41]​ Both publications seemed to build on previous developments. GP purchasing, distance between ministers and purchasers, economic regulation, and greater democratic legitimacy, were outlined.​[42]​ Moreover, these publications prepared the ground for a new measure (i.e., HSCA) to further strengthen the health market and, importantly from our perspective, to empower users by improving accountability within the health service and through enhanced stakeholder engagement. A feature of the government’s policy ambitions in the 2010 Paper could be seen in declarations to: make the NHS more accountable to patients; place decision making in the hands of professionals and patients; strengthen collective voice; create strong local infrastructure; and enhance engagement between decision makers, primary care professionals and service-users.​[43]​ The views of, and feedback from, service-users were regarded as integral to local health care arrangements.​[44]​ And there were certain additional features proposed to empower local people, such as the establishment of a national consumer champion.​[45]​ When it was enacted, the HSCA purported to do all of these things. Indeed, when introduced, the Act’s long title embedded some of these sentiments by suggesting that public involvement in health care was a key purpose.

Before considering the HSCA, and the extent to which these policy ambitions are embedded in its provisions, we first provide an overview of how this legislation organises the NHS more generally.

III.	ORGANISATION
It is important to provide a brief outline of how the HSCA organises services. First, commissioning refers to the process of contracting with health care providers for health services on behalf of service-users, within a geographically defined area. Now, the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) – which abolished PCTs – are responsible for commissioning. CCGs are regulated by NHS England, and while they mainly comprise GPs, a lay member and other experts in accountancy, nursing and secondary care must sit on each CCG’s governing body.​[46]​ Generally speaking, CCGs are expected to engage service-users and the public to inform decision making,​[47]​ and, a CCG member must sit on a Health and Wellbeing Board (HWB).​[48]​ This latter point highlights the purported collaborative nature of the commissioning process, for HWBs are panels of experts, leaders and service user representatives that meet and seek to influence commissioning and ensure health and social service delivery is integrated. Second, health care provision refers to those types of treatments that are not provided by GPs. NHS Foundation Trusts are typical treatment providers, although the HSCA allows for provision by the private sector. Monitor regulates the health market (e.g., market entry) through the use of a licensing system and the enforcement of competition law. As such, it is empowered, inter alia, to set and modify licence conditions, revoke licences, and conduct investigations.​[49]​It is important to note that Monitor’s overarching duty is to promote efficient and effective health services.​[50]​Third, to champion the consumer, the HSCA establishes Healthwatch England.​[51]​ Healthwatch England is under a duty to build a picture of health and social care across the country, and it must provide advice to the Secretary of State, local authorities, NHS England and Local Healthwatch Organisations (LHOs) on the views and experiences of service-users and the public.​[52]​ LHOs, which replace LINks and are constituted with lay representatives of local users, have the responsibility of reaching views on standards of, and ways to improve, the health of local people.​[53]​ Importantly, LHOs are also required to assist Healthwatch England and to provide it with advice, assistance and information​[54]​ about access to, and choice regarding, health services.​[55]​ LHOs can also make recommendations on the need for investigations into services.​[56]​

Our focus is on two types of activity that support the three areas of commissioning, provision, and consumer championing.  We class these as reporting and non-reporting (e.g., consultations, meetings) activities. These two types of activity are important to health services, for they are the key tools through which stakeholder engagement can realistically occur. And this is important because, according to policy discourse leading up to the HSCA, and as highlighted previously, the engagement of stakeholders is a necessary vehicle for empowering patients and enabling them to challenge matters relating to NHS service management.​[57]​By analysing relevant provisions relating to the two types of activity, we now show that the HSCA is configured such that there is a weakening of user voice and public engagement in relation to the three areas of commissioning, provision, and consumer championing.

IV.	REPORTING 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 (below) give an overview of the bodies with reporting duties, and summarise the main methods to be used for reporting and the primary content of those reports. 

The Tables are organised using the following three questions: Does the HSCA specify the purpose of reporting? Which audience must the report target? And are recipients required to respond? These questions, which we simplify as purpose, target audience, and response, are informed by research into social reporting.​[58]​ Social reporting, among other things, tries to generate a proper dialogue and exchange between reporting actors and their various stakeholders or constituents.​[59]​ It encourages the mutual identification of social values​[60]​ which, it is said, promotes organisational reflexivity.​[61]​  For us, it is arguable that an effective reporting model can enable stakeholders – such as service-users – to benefit if open and continued dialogue with key NHS bodies is established. It may encourage providers, regulators, and other regulated actors to improve practices, and therefore may help to fulfil the policy ambitions of making their decision making more accountable (e.g., asking questions, eliciting information) and transparent in the areas of commissioning, provision and consumer championing.

Looking first at the purpose of reporting, attention should be directed to the reporting functions of CCGs and their regulator, NHS England (Table 1). Both must compile annual reports and plans​[62]​ on how their functions and duties have been and will be carried out throughout the year. A plain reading of this requirement suggests these bodies must disclose, for example, those procedures in place to carry out their functions. As the Act’s wording makes clear, reporting here relates to how commissioning functions are undertaken.  There is, it would seem, no requirement to disclose what activities they will or have been involved in, suggesting there is less emphasis on substance. Thus, while there is a level of transparency, this transparency seems selective. On another point, there is a requirement for CCGs to publish performance assessment results, and for NHS England to provide the CCG with an opinion on whether the latter’s commissioning plans take account of measures taken by the HWB to address local needs (i.e., the joint health and wellbeing strategy). There are, furthermore, requirements on NHS England and CCGs to report to each other on several commissioning related matters (e.g., the preparation of commissioning plans and proposals and CCG dissolution). These observations show some user engagement, particularly in relation to the publication of performance assessment results, yet it could go farther if it is to meet the robust criteria of a social reporting model.  The reason for this is that current reporting is, as suggested below, more about the selective release of information than the process of genuine dialogue and exchange between NHS bodies on the one hand, and users and citizens on the other.  

With regard to health care provision, the annual report of an NHS provider must contain information on performance, director’s pay, remuneration and expenses (Table 2). The HSCA removes the requirement in the National Health Service Act (NHSA) 2006 for providers to make the latest information on their forward planning available for inspection.​[63]​ Overall, this seems to provide only a narrow – and one could argue narrowing – opportunity for proper user engagement, because the purpose of these reports seems, once again, selective. Moreover, this is compounded by the HSCA’s failure to define what should constitute NHS provider performance. On health care provision, Table 2 shows that Monitor has a duty to report on several crucial and specific issues. For example, it must report on actions taken where providers pose significant risks to users (e.g., provider failure) and refer providers for investigation to the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (formerly the Competition Commission) where it reasonably suspects a provider is engaged in anti-competitive conduct. Monitor should also make statements on how conflicts in its duties have been resolved. The Act’s Explanatory Notes specifically refer to the potential conflict between Monitor’s duty to address provider failure and its duty to regulate the health market, and moreover, these Notes talk of the need to put up “Chinese walls” within its organisation so that information relating to individual cases does not influence its own particular competition functions.​[64]​ It is also interesting to note that Monitor’s annual report, which is possibly the most accessible and comprehensive of reports it must produce, focuses mainly on measures it has taken to promote resource efficiency, effectiveness, and how it has exercised its functions. As we have already noted in relation to commissioning bodies, the HSCA does not require the annual report to disclose the substance of Monitor’s activities.

A similar picture emerges when we consider the area of consumer championing, for Table 3 shows that Healthwatch England must report on how its functions are exercised, and not on the substance of its activities. Equally, the Care Quality Commission (CQC), an independent regulator for health services, and the body within which the Healthwatch England committee sits, must publish a report on the arrangements put in place for Healthwatch England to perform its functions. Healthwatch England must furthermore report on the views and needs of local users of health services as well as LHOs and how standards can be improved.  For example, this could include informing NHS England of any service user concerns that are identified from feedback from LHOs about problems with the commissioning of maternity services.​[65]​ With regard to the reporting function of LHOs, there must be annual disclosure of activities as well as information relating to spending​[66]​ and any other such matters as the Secretary of State may direct.​[67]​ It is worth stating that out of all the bodies under examination here, LHOs are the only bodies that are required to annually disclose their actual activities. It is also important to note that these requirements applied to LINks and thus survive HSCA reforms, and so appear at odds with the HSCA’s ambition of galvanising local voice and separating ministerial influence from NHS services.
In terms of target audience, Table 1 shows that most reports in the area of commissioning fail to identify a recipient to whom the report should be directed. Where it does identify a recipient, arguably the report must be directed to a body that is more expert oriented and does not necessarily represent the full spectrum of views and interests of lay users. A copy of the CCG’s commissioning plan is the only document produced in the area of commissioning that must be sent to a body that has less focus on technical expertise and process and greater emphasis of local priorities, users and the public (i.e., the HWB).​[68]​ And while there is a requirement for CCGs and NHS England to publish all their reports, the HSCA does not define the word publication – a publication, for example, could be buried amongst other online publications and hence difficult for the service-user to locate.   

Equally, Table 2 demonstrates that in relation to the area of health care provision, NHS providers only need to submit their annual reports to Monitor and their annual accounts to an auditor. Thus, both the nature of the information provided, and the audience to whom the information must be sent, seem narrow. For example, Monitor is an economic regulator whose members tend to comprise those with economic or financial expertise. Pertinently, with the exception of the requirement to direct a notice to Healthwatch England regarding the modification of licence conditions, Monitor is not required to direct any of its reports to a body that is more representative of the service user or the public, suggesting a lack of dialogue between the regulator and the user. It is also interesting to note that while Monitor is required to publish its reports – other than its annual report and notification of enforcement action! – we once again see that the word publication is not defined in the Act.
Table 3 indicates that in the area of consumer championing, LHOs must receive a copy of Healthwatch England’s annual report. Healthwatch England is also required to publish this annual report, and the CQC must publish a report on what arrangements have been put in place to enable Healthwatch England to perform its functions. Again, the word publication is not defined. In contrast to this, the HSCA requires that an LHO’s annual report must be made publicly available in a manner it considers appropriate after consulting guidance. The HSCA does not actually define what is meant by public availability, but it does seem that publicly available is a different (and possibly more onerous) standard to that of publication. Does this mean, then, that LHOs have to do more than, say, Monitor, when it comes to disclosing relevant information? Overall, and drawing on Pruzan,​[69]​ these observations indicate that the HSCA’s policy ambition of stimulating stakeholder involvement may be undermined by a lack of clarity and specificity over how information is disclosed to service-users and the public.

Lastly, when considering response, it is worth stating that critical to social reporting is the ability of stakeholders to respond, as this goes towards creating exchange and dialogue. The HSCA requires a response from a targeted audience in few situations, most notably in the area of commissioning. Even then, opportunities for service-users to respond are limited. Table 1 shows that when NHS England has presented its annual report to Parliament and has submitted it to the Secretary of State, the latter must then publish a letter in response detailing the assessment of NHS England’s performance. Table 1 further shows that in response to being sent the draft CCG commissioning plan, NHS England must provide a copy of its opinion to the CCG on whether the plan takes account of the joint health and wellbeing strategy. Overall, there seems little provision for full engagement between users, the public and key regulatory actors, so that the expectations of all stakeholders can inform decision making processes.

V.	NON-REPORTING ACTIVITIES AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
The HSCA purports to strengthen user and public involvement in the three areas of NHS functioning by adopting a series of other (non-reporting) stakeholder involvement measures. This is illustrated in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 

The following three questions guide the content of these Tables: What mechanisms are used to involve stakeholders and who is targeted? Do target groups fully represent service-users? And are target groups required to respond? These questions, which once again derive from ideas around effective social reporting and its relationship with stakeholder engagement, help to ascertain whether the HSCA can bring about a more meaningful process of dialogue and exchange.

With regard to commissioning, Table 4 outlines the HSCA’s commitment to stakeholder engagement and involvement. In addition to the requirement to hold public meetings to present their annual report,​[70]​ CCGs must engage in consultation with users and the HWB on the following matters: the preparation of commissioning plans; how these plans link up with the health and wellbeing strategy;​[71]​ the planning of commissioning decisions and proposals that, if implemented, would have an impact on the way services are delivered; and how CCGs take account of the views of service-users.  CCGs are thus required to engage with service-users. However, the HSCA does not provide any opportunity for users to be involved in the commissioning decision making process, over and above planning. This is also reflected in the requirement that CCGs must describe, in their constitution, the measures taken to involve users in the planning of commissioning arrangements. A CCG must also, with the assistance of published guidance from NHS England, promote the involvement of users in preventing and diagnosing illness (this reflects the 2010 White Paper’s commitment to and indeed sentiment of ‘no decision without me’​[72]​). That said, if we consider the Explanatory Notes on this point, then it appears to confine this commitment to providing opportunities for users to participate in treatment decisions in partnership with health professionals and providing discussion opportunities for patients to manage their own condition.​[73]​ In other words, there seems to be no real engagement provided for in relation to actual commissioning decisions.

Interestingly, under the arrangements provided by the HSCA, both CCGs and NHS England are under a duty to engage with service-users in developing proposals which, if implemented, would change how services are delivered (see Table 4).  Yet this duty is qualified, in that both bodies can choose one of three methods for discharging the duty. These three methods are: i) consulting with users; ii) providing users with information; or iii) using – in the Act’s words – other ways. The term other ways, which in itself is vague, is not defined by the HSCA. That said, NHS England appears to have put this into practice through several initiatives. There has been information surveys of specific groups (e.g., pregnant women) in order to elicit information, website satisfaction surveys, newsletters and stakeholder registration systems.​[74]​And while these activities have been undertaken, it is arguable that the HSCA does not provide a mandate for dialogue and full exchange between commissioning authorities and service-users.

As Table 4 shows, more explicit requirements exist for CCGs to consult on their own commissioning plans. The Act stipulates that this must involve a draft of the commissioning plan being presented to the HWB and care recipients. Relating to this, CCGs must summarise care recipients’ views and explain how these views have been considered. In addition, CCGs must consult the HWB on whether the draft commissioning plan takes proper account of the HWB’s health and wellbeing strategy. In response, the HWB is required to provide the CCG with a copy of its opinion. Interestingly here, CCGs are not required to reply to the HWB’s opinion or re-engage the HWB about how the opinion will influence the commissioning plan. This then raises concerns over the extent to which the HSCA enables ongoing and meaningful exchange between actors, so that user and public voice properly inform the commissioning process. Rather, it seems that engagement and exchange among experts is a more prevalent arrangement in the process. Table 4 shows that the HSCA places CCGs under a duty to obtain advice from professional clinical expertise in order to effectively discharge its duties, along with requirements for NHS England and CCGs to engage in consultation with each other on a range of crucial matters (e.g., CCG dissolution).

In relation to the area of health care provision, Table 5 shows that an NHS Foundation Trust must hold an annual and publicly accessible meeting of its members. One Director must attend,​[75]​ and the annual accounts must be presented, accompanied by an auditor’s report and the provider’s annual report. In the interests of transparency and accountability,​[76]​ members may vote on whether to approve amendments to these documents.​[77]​ However, the information that is required to be disclosed at this meeting relates primarily to financial matters. The question must be raised as to whether this disclosure requirement is sufficiently broad in scope to properly reflect the activities that may be of more interest to service-users (e.g., adverse clinical incidents, quality of care), and it raises the issue that some members of the public may not understand the complex and specialist nature of NHS funding and accounting. Moreover, the HSCA is silent on whether members of the public have a right to be heard and to ask questions. On health care provision, it is worth mentioning that Monitor, on the other hand, must consult with a diverse range of expert and political bodies (i.e., CCGs, NHS England, the Secretary of State, relevant health care providers, appropriate persons) when making determinations with regard to financially assisting struggling providers (i.e., imposing a financial levy) and proposing how to regulate prices for health care (i.e., proposals for the National Tariff). As such, the public does not constitute a specified target group in these situations. However, the public can attend Monitor’s Board meetings as specified by the Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act (PB(ATM)A) 1960 (as amended). In line with what has been said previously, there is no specified right under the HSCA for the public to ask questions or elicit information at these meetings. It is interesting to note that Monitor’s published Board minutes between June 2013 and February 2016 show that only ten members of the public attended Board meetings.​[78]​ It is also interesting to note that Monitor itself has acknowledged that the public does desire more engagement.​[79]​

With regards to consumer championing, the relevant functions and duties of Healthwatch England and LHOs are presented in Table 6. The HSCA requires LHOs to respectively target Healthwatch England, local health services and the public. A variety of engagement methods are specified by the HSCA, such as provision of advice and assistance, recommendations, and public meetings. Crucially, these target groups are not required by the Act to engage LHOs in response, perhaps in the form of questioning and dialogue. For example, there is no requirement to respond to an LHO and provide feedback on the advice that has been provided to Healthwatch England. There is, furthermore, no specified right for the public to ask questions and elicit information at LHO and Healthwatch England public meetings. Interestingly, Table 6 shows three instances where a target audience for engagement by LHOs and Healthwatch England are required to engage further. But the most telling aspect of these further engagements is that they must be directed to expert bodies in the main, as well as to government entities (i.e., Secretary of State, local authorities, Monitor, NHS England, CQC, Healthwatch England, local health services). In this respect, neither LHOs nor the public are meaningful response targets. This suggests that the values of engagement and exchange are undermined by the provisions of the Act. 

Having considered the detail of the HSCA’s provisions in the three main areas of NHS functioning, it is important to look at what this means in more general terms.

VI.	RHETORIC OR REALITY: DOES THE HSCA ENHANCE OR WEAKEN USER ENGAGEMENT?
The analysis provides an alternative way of looking at the HSCA, while simultaneously supplementing others’ views.  Stirton suggests the HSCA’s emphasis on efficiency represents a return to the telecommunications-inspired reforms of the 1980s.​[80]​  Others regard the HSCA as undermining the integrity of health services,​[81]​ or as an extension of Labour’s public sector reforms.​[82]​ The HSCA has been described as contributing to creeping privatisation,​[83]​ though this is questioned.​[84]​ The issue we explore is whether it serves to disengage users from the regulatory framework, and, if so, what this means.
The HSCA seems inconsistent with its underlying policy discourse. The policy ambitions to enhance user engagement and heighten public involvement have been diluted, and there is more scope for expert groups to communicate between themselves about how health services are managed.  Information disclosure through annual reports is a common feature across the three areas of functioning. The requirement that the annual reports of NHS England, Monitor and Healthwatch England must show how functions and duties have been discharged appears to deemphasise the substance of those functions and duties. There is nothing necessarily new about this. Previous legislation imposed a similar requirement on Monitor,​[85]​ suggesting little change in how Monitor undertakes its reporting duties.  But the same cannot be said for commissioning authorities. The predecessor of the CCGs, the PCTs, were required to disclose their audited accounts, report annually on their activities, and publicise these activities.​[86]​ Now, CCGs only have to report on how they have discharged their functions and duties, which appears to be a notable departure from pre-HSCA annual reporting requirements.​[87]​ By not requiring CCGs to report on activities, stakeholders may find it more difficult to scrutinise what CCGs are doing, thus preventing users and the public from having meaningful engagement with CCGs.    This is important, for a CCG’s activities can include those that can harm users’ interests. CCG members may have commercial interests in health care provision, which may cause conflicts of interest and distort priorities in commissioning practices.​[88]​ Furthermore, as seen, Monitor, CCGs, NHS England, and Healthwatch England are not required by the HSCA to engage in ongoing exchange with the representative of local voice (i.e., LHOs) on matters of health service delivery. In addition, the Secretary of State appears to have influence over the contents of an LHO’s annual report, owing to the requirement that its report must include such matters as the Secretary of State may direct.​[89]​ This suggests the LHO is a less-than independent voice. 

These observations, like many observations made in this paper, contribute to concerns that the HSCA weakens accountability.​[90]​ While accountability can mean different things in different contexts, it shares common features with a social reporting model. Generally, accountability can be seen as the duty to explain and justify past conduct.​[91]​ The increasing complexity of public services – including the NHS – has required regular clarification of the concept of accountability.​[92]​ Indeed, beyond traditional forms of public accountability (i.e., accountability to Parliament and the electorate), we see other forms of accountability and other bodies being held to account in different ways. The shift during the 1980s towards managerial, procedural and financial accountability within public services suggests the concept is open to revision.​[93]​ More recently, the delegation of regulatory authority over public services show accountability to be fragmented.​[94]​ So, from our perspective, independent actors (e.g., CCGs, NHS providers) that are ordinarily immune from close scrutiny, become opened up to scrutiny by other independent actors (e.g., NHS England, Monitor).  Despite the different conceptual formulations of accountability, the HSCA’s underlying policy commitments purport to increase accountability and empower service-users to ‘ask, challenge and intervene’.​[95]​ In order to identify whether the HSCA fulfils these commitments, the article uses a concept of accountability that is sufficiently rigorous, analytically speaking, to facilitate discussion. This concept is core accountability. Bovens defines core accountability as the obligation to explain and justify conduct, suggesting that it implies a relationship between an actor, the accountor, and a forum, the accountee.​[96]​  Core accountability, in essence, is about asking questions, eliciting information and passing judgement.  

The analysis demonstrates that a number of NHS bodies are not required to disclose their activities in any of their reports. This makes it more difficult for service-users and the public (e.g., through LHOs) to scrutinise the activities of these bodies, make enquiries, and elicit responses on matters of crucial importance; for example, Monitor’s Board members may hold financial interests in the health care provider sector, which may create conflicts of interest and distort regulatory priorities. This problem is compounded by the lack of specificity in the HSCA. As pointed out, the HSCA requires many NHS bodies to publish their reports, but without defining publication. Without a statutory definition, NHS bodies may adopt inadequate or inconsistent publishing practices, which stifle user access to information and, from a core accountability perspective, hinder the formation of judgments about information. It could also be argued that the HSCA is both imbalanced and selective, in that stakeholder engagement is emphasised in some areas more than others. For instance, there appear to be many opportunities for engagement between expert bodies (i.e., NHS England and CCGs) in the area of commissioning, but fewer opportunities for engagement between expert bodies and lay users. Similarly, the area of consumer championing shows that there are minimal opportunities for LHOs to meaningfully engage other expert bodies. 

Interestingly, requirements for LHOs and Healthwatch England to engage a target audience appears to activate further engagement activities between expert bodies mainly, and senior government entities. This theme is reflected in the area of health care provision. The analysis shows that most of Monitor’s report recipients are other expert bodies, and that its consultation targets do not include service-users and the public. However, it could be said that provisions requiring NHS bodies, including Monitor, to open their Board meetings to the public under the PB(ATM)A create the conditions under which real public engagement can flourish. Yet, these requirements do not explicitly require these bodies to target the public. Instead, the public has to target these bodies by attending the meeting. And in relation to NHS providers, information disclosure at these meetings is confined by the HSCA to financial information, so it is questionable, given the complexities and specialist nature of NHS funding, whether users or the public would have a proper grasp on this information in order to effectively scrutinise. With no express right for users and the public to question, elicit information and be heard at meetings held under the PB(ATM)A, there would seem to be no clear route for them to influence decision making and hold NHS bodies to account.

Not only do these observations support the argument that the HSCA diminishes core accountability, but they create conditions in which closed expert communities can form and operate. These communities form because, it is suggested, their inhabitants share common interests, knowledge and skills, and face similar problems. With that, community members talk mainly with each other, produce knowledge about their environment and share information amongst themselves.​[97]​ On the one hand, in relation to commissioning, our analysis shows that user involvement is limited to the planning of commissioning decisions and the development of proposals that, if implemented, would change how health services are delivered. The HSCA ‘fences off’ user involvement, as it were, from commissioning decisions and the approval of proposals for change.  User voice does not seem to inform aspects of the commissioning process that actually instigate change. Rather, the HSCA creates conditions where commissioning authorities communicate with each other and share information within decision making processes, without user input. Core accountability is unable to fully permeate commissioning processes since the arrangements in place inhibit opportunities to ask questions and elicit information about commissioning decisions. 

Similarly, our work shows that commissioning authorities – CCGs and NHS England – have the option of either carrying out a consultation, or providing information, or using other ways to engage users in relation to developing proposals which, if implemented, would change how services are delivered.  It was argued that the HSCA, by offering a choice of engagement methods, does not provide a mandate for dialogue and full exchange between commissioning authorities and users. Before 2012, commissioners were under a firm duty to consult, and to produce a report on their consultation with users before carrying out commissioning decisions and to produce a report on how the consultation process influenced these decisions.​[98]​ The emphasis here highlights a more demanding duty to consult and report, suggesting previous arrangements were more supportive of user engagement.​[99]​

This problem is compounded by the HSCA’s failure to require commissioning authorities to directly report to LHOs on developments (e.g., CCG dissolution) that may be detrimental to local health care services. So despite previous policy assurances that the duty to involve public and service-users will play an important role in commissioning locally,​[100]​ the HSCA does not mention LHOs at all in this context.​[101]​ The HSCA goes as far as to prohibit LHOs from promoting or opposing change in the law in relation to any matter.​[102]​ There may be valid reasons for this prohibition (e.g., to prevent resource diversion). But, it nevertheless shows that the HSCA curbs user voice. It could also be said that the HSCA, in requiring LHOs to contract with local authorities to support the commissioning process,​[103]​ promote it​[104]​ and to make ‘reports and recommendations about how local care services could or ought to be improved’,​[105]​ potentially overburdens LHOs with heavier workloads, thus reviving old problems.​[106]​ From a core accountability perspective, such observations suggest that the LHOs appear stifled in their ability to devote resources to asking questions of, and eliciting information from, commissioning authorities.
Generally speaking, by drawing upon core accountability we are able to question the underlying policy claim that the HSCA increases accountability and improves service user engagement.  LHOs act as local voice for service-users and the public, but appear to be left out of the reporting and stakeholder engagement process across all three areas of NHS activity. In theory however, Healthwatch England – as a consumer champion – represents the interests of service-users and the public. As a consumer champion, it is required to engage expert bodies like NHS England and the CQC on behalf of service-users. Healthwatch England’s expertise may enable it to carry out this engagement competently because its committee possesses legal, managerial, clinical and economic expertise.​[107]​ In other words, this expertise enables Healthwatch England to navigate complex health service issues and confidently engage other expert bodies on behalf of users and the public. Despite the potential advantages this expertise brings, we have been able to show that the HSCA does not provide for reciprocal engagement between Healthwatch England and LHOs. As a consequence, current stakeholder engagement arrangements do not sufficiently connect all aspects of the consumer championing framework together in relationships of meaningful engagement over crucial health service matters. Generally, these observations suggest that questions inevitably surface over whether consumer championing in its current form fulfils the policy ambition to strengthen the collective voice of service-users.​[108]​

A remaining question to address is ‘Why are current stakeholder engagement arrangements in the HSCA misaligned from their underlying policy commitments?’ To answer this, we look to the view that public service management and reform often express a preference for organizing services using a collection of highly debatable doctrines that earn acceptance in the policy domain through appeals to rhetoric and persuasion, as opposed to truth and objectivity.​[109]​ The NHS since the 1980s has been influenced by the ideology of NPM and the introduction of doctrines, such as the avoidance of direct state management of public services and increased competition, with an emphasis on a distinct set of administrative values (i.e., economy and parsimony).​[110]​  These doctrines are not new. They are known to fashionably rotate in and out of political currency to solve recurrent problems (e.g., making efficiency gains).  But they lack empirical support, appear tried-and-tested and are limited in their political acceptability.​[111]​ To earn acceptance in the policy domain, these doctrines are made to appear persuasive and credible using a strong policy discourse. This is done through: ambiguity (e.g., ‘something in it for everyone’); metaphor (e.g., ‘it sounds right’); higher causes (e.g., ‘for the public good only’); and novelty (e.g., ‘it is not obsolete’).​[112]​ Crucially, these factors render proposals for reform sufficiently ambiguous, malleable and novel to the extent that the highly-debatable doctrines underpinning these reforms are presented as new, exciting and necessary. It is also contended by Hood and Jackson that NPM has been held out to be ‘a formula for collective benefit’ by some policy makers. On closer inspection however, this philosophy secures private benefits for elites.​[113]​ As we have seen, the legislative framework of the HSCA sows the seeds for closed expert communities to form, share vital information, and indeed to benefit from this going forward. 






The HSCA marks a return to the doctrine that ministers should generally be separated from NHS functioning, and that market-based arrangements should be promoted. We add, further, that the HSCA – through its extant stakeholder engagement provisions – supports these doctrines by enabling expert bodies beyond the state to: communicate with each other; share information; learn about the regulatory environment; fluidly discharge functions that uphold the health market; and avoid carrying out activities (e.g., user and public engagement) that sit in potential conflict with the aims of this market (e.g., efficiency). Granted, these conclusions come with caveats. Important differences exist generally between the way the NHS regulatory framework is configured on the one hand, and regulatory practice on the other.​[117]​ Our observations do not account for what actually happens in practice. Rather, the purpose of this article is to show that the arrangements in place to institute stakeholder engagement across the NHS are configured in ways that do not fulfil policy ambitions in this area. With this in mind, we should be vigilant. 






Table 1: Reporting (Commissioning)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format 	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Target Audience	Publication Requirements 	Target Audience Response
CCGNHS England	s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z11(1)–(6) of the NHSA 2006s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z15(1)–(6) of the NHSA2006s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z16(6) of the NHSA 2006s 23, HSCA 2012 inserting s 13U(1)–(6)(a) of the NHSA 2006s 23, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z22(2) of the NHSA 2006s 23, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z22(3) of the NHSA 2006s 23, HSCA 2012 inserting s 13T(1)–(2) of the NHSA 2006s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting ss 13R(4); 14U(1)–(2); 14W(2); 14Z8(1)–(3); 14Z2(4);14Z11(7); 14Z22(6); 223K(7) of the NHSA 2006	Plan Annual Report and AccountsReportAnnual Report State-ment; ReportBusiness PlanGuid-ance; Docu-ment	Disclosing how functions: to be exercised; improve quality; reduce inequality; involve public Disclosing how functions: discharged; contribute to delivery of joint health and wellbeing strategy; facilitate financial disclosure Summarising performance assessment resultsDisclosing: how functions have been exercised/discharged; mandate objectives met; business plan proposals given effectExplanation of proposed CCG dissolution; response to consultationResponse to consultation on CCG dissolution Disclosing: how functions/duties: to be exercised; improve quality; reduce inequality; involve the public To facilitate: commissioning plans;  expert advice; user involvement in care and treatment decisions; provider payments; CCG dissolution; safety	NHS England; HWBNHS England Not specifiedParliamentSecretary of StateCCG; local authority; ‘appro-priate persons’Not specifiedNot specifiedCCGs; Health-watch England	Yes YesYesYes Not specifiedYesYesYes	NHS England to provide its opinion Comptroller and Auditor General may examine accountsNot SpecifiedSecretary of State must send a letter to NHS England Not specifiedNot specifiedNot specifiedNot specified
Table 2: Reporting (Health Care Provision)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format 	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Target Audience	Publication Requirements 	Target Audience Response
NHS Foundation TrustsMonitor	s 156(1), HSCA 2012 inserting Schedule 7, para 26 (2) of the NHSA 2006s 154(8), HSCA 2012 inserting Schedule 7, para 24(2) and (4A) of the NHSA 2006Schedule 8, paras 19(2) and 21(1)–(4); ss 67(8)(a) and (b); 69(10)(a) and (b); 109(1) of the HSCA 2012ss 101(2); 118(1), (3) (13); 141(3)(a)–(e); 141(3); Schedule 11, para 1  of the HSCA 2012ss 67(3)–(7); 100(2), 100(4); 68(1) – (6) of the HSCA 2012ss 69(1)(a)–(e), 69(4)(b), (10)(a)–(b) of the HSCA 2012ss 99(1); 99(3) and (4); 110 (1)(a)–(c) of the HSCA 2012	Annual ReportAnnual Accounts; Auditor’s ReportAnnual Report and AccountsNotice; ReferenceStatementAssess-mentNotifi-cations 	Disclosing Corporation/ Director’s performance, pay, expensesDisclosing financial health of corporationDisclosing: how functions/duties have been discharged; measures taken to promote efficiency and effectiveness; compliance with Ministerial guidance Matters relating to: National Tariff; imposing a financial levy; proposals to modify licences; imposing discretionary requirements; investigation reference to CMA; Explaining: resolution of conflict in duties; proposed actions to review functions Disclosing proposals likely to have “significant impact”Notifying of significant risks; enforcement action 	Monitor Monitor; AuditorParliament (Annual Report only); Secretary of State; Comptroller and Auditor General (Annual Accounts only)CCGs,  appropriate persons; Secretary of State, NHS England; relevant provider; CQC, Healthwatch England; CMANot specifiedNot specifiedNHS England; CCGs; those exercising regulatory functions	Not specifiedNot specifiedNot specifiedNot specifiedNot specifiedYesYes (except in relation to enforcement action)	Not specifiedAudit to be carried out by auditorComp-troller and Auditor General to examine accountsCMA may investigate in response to ReferenceNot specifiedNot specifiedNot specified
Table 3: Reporting (Consumer Championing)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format 	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Target Audience	Publication Requirements 	Target Audience Response




Table 4: Non-reporting (Commissioning)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Target Audience 	Target Audience Response
CCGNHS England	s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14Z15(6)(b) of the NHSA 2006s 26, HSCA 2012  inserting ss 14Z13(2), (4)(a), (5), (6) (8); 14Z15(3) of the NHSA 2006; s 192(6) HSCA 2012 inserting s 116(8A) of the LGPIHA 2007s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14U(1)(a)–(b) of the NHSA 2006.s 26, HSCA 2012  inserting s 14Z2(2)(a)–(c) of the NHSA 2006s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting s 14W(1) of the NHSA 2006s 25, HSCA 2012  inserting s 14F(4); s 26, HSCA 2012 inserting ss 14Z(8)(3), 14Z16(4),  14Z22(1)(a)–(c) of the NHSA 2006s 23, HSCA 2012 inserting s 13Q(2) of the NHSA 2006Schedule 5, para 7, HSCA 2012 inserting Sched, para 1(fa) of the PB(ATM)A 1960	MeetingConsultInvolvement; promoting involvement of service-usersConsult “or in other ways”Advice ConsultConsult “or in other ways”Meeting	Presenting annual reportPreparing plans; enabling summary of individual’s views; explaining how views taken into account; reviewing CCG contribution to delivery of joint health and wellbeing strategy; assessing needsMatters relating to: preventing and diagnising illness; assessing needsMatters relating to user involvement in: planning and proposals that change service delivery Obtaining professional expert advice Varying CCG constitution; publication of guidance; CCG contribution to joint health and wellbeing strategy; CCG dissolutionMatters relating to involvement in proposals changing service deliveryTo discuss issues that are not confidential or prejudicial to the public interest	CCG membersHWB; recipients of care in a CCG’s area by a member of a CCG; appropriate personsService-users, representatives; LHOs; local peopleThose to whom services are being provided or may be providedProfessional expertiseCCGs affected; Healthwatch England; HWB; relevant local authoritiesThose to whom services provided/may be providedNHS England Board members	Not specifiedCopy of opinion from HWB on CCG’s contribution to delivery of joint health and wellbeing strategyNot specifiedNot specified Not specified Not specifiedNot specifiedNot specified


Table 5: Non-reporting (Health Care Provision)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Target Audience 	Target Audience Response





Table 6: Non-reporting (Consumer Championing)
Body	Core Statutory Provisions	Format	Content and Purpose of Disclosure	Specified Target Audience 	Target Audience Response
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